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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR DENNIS KUSY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 18360

K-MART APPAREL FASHIONS CORP.,
a Delaware corporation and
JOHN DOE, an individual,
Defendants/Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Arthur Dennis Kusy brought this action against
defendants K-Mart Apparel Fashions Corp. (hereinafter "defendant") and John Doe to recover for injuries he suffered as a
result of a fall from a wooden pallet being used by plaintiff
for the purpose of unloading trees from a truck on def endant's premises.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, entered judgment for defendant upon a special
jury verdict wherein the jury unanimously found that def endant was not negligent.
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The lower court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion
for a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the lower court's judgment
and order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a heavy truck driver since 1967, was injured
on May 21, 1976 at a K-Mart store in Murray, Utah, while he
was in the process of unloading shrubbery and trees from his
truck.

(R. 218, 227-30, 314).

Plaintiff was the only wit-

ness at trial who had actually seen how the accident
occurred.

(R. 353, 362).

In the statement of facts in his

brief, plaintiff has outlined in detail his version of the
accident, which version defendant incorporates with the
following additions.
Defendant agrees that plaintiff has had extensive background and experience with wooden pallets.

Of the million

and one-half miles of truck driving that plaintiff had done,
approximately 150,000 miles involved loads using wooden
pallets.

(R. 271).

Plaintiff further admits that he has

probably seen and worked around at least 250,000 pallets in
his life time.

(R. 271-72).
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Although defendant admits that it had several pallets in
its possession, it had no control over the pallets since
most, if not all, of the pallets were provided by the various
suppliers of goods to be sold in the garden shop.
336-37, 361).

(R.

The suppliers were free to retrieve their

pallets at any time, although defendant or another supplier
might use them in the meantime for loading, unloading or
storage.

(R. 338, 340-41, 358-60).

The pallet that plain-

tiff fell from, or through, was one of those pallets,
although its exact source is unknown.

(R. 345).

Mr. Hunt, the garden shop manager for defendant, stated
that he did not know whether the pallet had broken or whether
plaintiff had simply fallen off of the pallet and admitted
that the pallet could have broken.

(R. 368-69).

Neverthe-

less, plaintiff attempted to introduce K-Mart's Answers to
Interrogatories, specifically Interrogatory No. 9, at trial.
(R. 365, 367-68).

Therein, defendant K-Mart (not witness

Hunt), in answer to a question regarding its version of the
accident, stated that the pallet broke.

(R. 65-66).

The

lower court refused to admit the answer and would not allow
plaintiff to read the interrogatory and answer to Mr. Hunt.
(R. 365, 422).
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The jury, in its special verdict, found that neither
plaintiff nor defendant were negligent in causing the accident.

(R. 187-88).

Plaintiff moved for a new trial on March 2, 1982 on similar grounds as this appeal.

(R. 190-91).

The motion was

denied by the lower court on March 11, 1982.

(R. 195).

ARGUMENT
As grounds for reversal, plaintiff contends:

(1) that

the trial court improperly failed to give his requested jury
instructions on res ipsa loquitur; (2) that the trial court's
instruction on unavoidable accident was improper; (3) that
the trial court improperly excluded defendant's answer to
Interrogatory No. 9 in its Answers to Interrogatories for the
purpose of cross examining defendant's witness, Mr. Hunt; and
(4) that the jury's failure to award general damages indicated passion and prejudice for which a new trial should have
been granted.
Plaintiff has failed to establish that the trial court
committed reversible error under any of the above-described
circumstances.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Defendant agrees that Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956), sets forth elements
of res ipsa loquitur.

There, the court stated the following

general rule:
In order to invoke this doctrine it is generally recognized that the following elements must be
present: (1) That the accident was of a kind which,
in the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed; (2) That it
happened irrespective of any participation by the
plaintiff; and (3) That the cause thereof was something under the management or control of the def endant, or for which it is responsible.
Id., 302 P.2d at 472 (footnotes omitted).

With regard to the

third element, this court, in Wightman, further stated:
w[I]f the evidence reasonably eliminates other explanations
than the defendant's negligence, that provides the basis upon
which the jury may be permitted to infer that it was the
defendant's negligence which resulted in the injury.w

Id.,

302 P.2d at 473.
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are set out, in the
Restatement of Torts, in a manner virtually identical to the
elements described in Wightman.

Section 328D provides:

(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the
plaintiff is caused by negligence of the defendant
when

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§

3280 (1965).

Plaintiff has failed to establish that the elements of
res ipsa loquitur are present in this case.

The fact that

the court gave the unavoidable accident instruction (discussed below) and the fact that the jury found neither party
was negligent demonstrates that the accident involved in this
case, in the ordinary course of events, could have happened
and in fact did happen, in the absence of negligence.
Moreover, the evidence has failed to eliminate other
explanations (namely, the acts of plaintiff and/or third persons) that reasonably could have caused the accident or that
the pallet allegedly causing the accident was under the
management, control or responsibility of defendant.
The situation in this case was not unlike a masterservant situation wherein the employee is injured during his
employment.

Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur no

longer applies to master-servant situations because of
worker's compensation laws, some earlier cases and cases from
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other jurisdictions are instructive with regard to the application of res ipsa loquitur here.
In Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wash. 2d 802, 180 P.2d 564
(1947), plaintiff brought an action against defendant for the
death of her husband resulting from a fall in an elevator
shaft at the deceased's place of employment.

The trial court

entered judgment on a verdict for plaintiff but the
Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the
plaintiff's deceased was presumed to have exercised due care,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.

The

court stated:
We have here a situation where the person
injured knew as much about the elevator and its
manner of operation as did the appellants, perhaps
more, and there is no element of exclusive control.
•

•

•

• • . When it is shown that the accident might
have happened as a result of one of two causes, the
reason for the rule [res ipsa loquitur] fails, and
it cannot be invoked.
Id., 180 P.2d at 571 (quoting Wellons v. Wiley, 24 Wash. 2d
543, 166 P.2d 852, 855 (1946)).
Similarly, in Sabol v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 313 Mo.
527, 282

s.w.

425 (1925), plaintiff was injured when a stack

of barrel staves fell upon him while he was in the course of
his employment for defendant.

The lower court entered judg-

ment on a verdict for plaintiff, but the Missouri Supreme
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Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.

The court made the following statement:

•[N]o presumption of negligence on the part of the master
arises, where it does not appear that an appliance was
originally defective, or that it has been so long in use as
to render the duty of inspection necessary, or that the
master had due notice of the defect.•

Id., 282 s.w. at 429.

The court further stated: •[w]here the servant or his associates have knowledge or opportunity to know of the defect, the
rule does not apply . . . • •

Id., 282 s.w. at 430 (emphasis

added).
The court in Sabol closely follows Klebe v. Parker
Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480, 105 s.w. 1057 (1907).

There,

the lower court granted a demurrer to defendant and the
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employee
injured by the fall of an elevator was not entitled to assert
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because •[i]f the elevator
or the cable was defective or out of repair, there was
nothing to prevent plaintiff and his co-employes from seeing
them • • . . •

Id., 105 s.w. at 1060.

Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a judgment
for plaintiff in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1,
62 P.2d 1297 (1936), holding that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was not applicable when a gas heater provided by the
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employer but lit by the employee, exploded.
stated:

The court

•[I]f the circumstances do not show or suggest that

defendant should have that superior knowledge, or if the
plaintiff himself possesses equal or superior means of
explaining the occurrence, the rule may not properly be
invoked.•

Id., 62 P.2d at 1308.

In the instant case, plaintiff's injuries could have had
two possible causes:

(1) plaintiff fell off of the pallet

for some reason; or (2) the pallet broke because of an undiscovered or latent defect in the pallet.

The jury could have

drawn an inference from the evidence that plaintiff fell from
the pallet.

Therefore, there was evidence that plaintiff

participated and the res ipsa loquitur instructions were not
proper.
Even if plaintiff's injury was caused by a latent or
undiscovered defect, the plaintiff had substantial knowledge
and experience with regard to wooden pallets.

(R. 58-59).

It is doubtful that Mr. Hunt or anyone at defendant's store
had superior or even equal knowledge to plaintiff regarding
wooden pallets.

Plaintiff was closest to the pallet at the

time of the injury and was best able to detect and observe
the defects, if any, in the pallet.

Consequently, it does

not appear that this accident was one which would have
occurred without the participation of plaintiff, whether that
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participation was negligent or not, and the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur does not apply.
Numerous other explanations for the accident can be
inferred from the evidence.

Also, possible participation by

third parties also indicates that the pallet from or through
which plaintiff fell was not within the control or responsibility of the defendant.

Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur cannot be applied.

At least two Utah cases support

this proposition.
In Reich v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District No.

l1

29 Utah 2d 125, 506 P.2d 53 (1973), several home owners

sued the sewer district for a sewer backup causing flooding
of raw sewage into their homes.

The lower court instructed

the jury upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The jury

found that defendant did not have exclusive control of the
system but that the defendant did have responsible control.
Consequently, the jury awarded damages and judgment was
entered in the favor plaintiffs.

This court reversed the

lower court and held that because there were numerous other
possible explanations for the defect in the sewer line
(namely, items placed in the line by some 270 users on
lateral lines, people entering manholes at their convenience
or digging in the area by contractors) that could not have
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been caused by defendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was inapplicable.

Id., 506 P.2d at 54.

Reich indicates that exclusive control, rather than mere
responsibility, is required to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Id., 506 P.2d at 53.

Thus, res ipsa loquitur is

not applicable to this case, as defendant clearly did not
have exclusive control over the pallet.

Nevertheless, the

evidence in the instant case does not even show that def endant had •responsible control• of the pallet.

Many other

explanations for plaintiff's injury would take it out of
either the control or responsibility of defendant and indicate that negligence should not be inferred.

The suppliers

of the pallet could have caused a latent defect when they
constructed the pallet.

Third parties could have run over or

otherwise tampered with the pallets as Mr. Hunt testified.
(R. 341, 365-66).

As in Reich, the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur should not apply when there are so many possible
explanations for the occurrence.
In Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 11 Utah 2d 30, 354
P.2d 580 (1960), plaintiff claimed he swallowed a paper clip
lodged in a bottle of soda beverage that defendants bottled
and retailed.

The lower court granted summary judgment for

defendant and this court affirmed, holding that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.

This court explained
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that since prior to consumption, the plaintiff had stored the
beverage in an unlocked fruit room connected with his garage
(which was also open on occasion) and since invitees to a
birthday party were free to go into the room at any time,
defendant did not have management or control of the bottle or
beverage contained therein.

This court cited an earlier case

with approval and stated:
[I]njustice . . . might eventuate by inferring negligence against a bottler in a case like this, where
the container has a cap that easily can be removed
and replaced without detection, and over which container the bottler has no further control in the
hands of intermediaries including retailers, ultimate consumers, invitees to a party, or others who
easily could have had access to the bottle . • • .
• . . To say the bottler here had any control
when the plaintiff purchased the bottle from [the
retail store], and thereafter, simply would be to
blind oneself to the facts.
Id., 354 P.2d at 581 (citing Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (1950)).
Milligan and Jordan are analogous to the facts of the
instant case.

There is absolutely no evidence that defendant

manufactured the pallets used by plaintiff.
provided for plaintiff's convenience.

They were merely

The pallets were

accessible to third parties and could easily be tampered with
at any time either before or after they came into defendant's
possession.

(R. 341, 365-66).

The facts of this case simply

do not justify application of res ipsa loquitur.
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Other jurisdictions have supported the holdings of Reich
and Milligan.

See, e.g., Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons

Structural Steel Co., 328 Mo. 72, 40 S.W.2d 702, 705 (1931)
(other possible explanations, including latent defects or
other facts raising equally valid inferrences of negligence,
prevent the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur); De Witt Properties, Inc. v. City of New York, 44
N.Y.2d 417, 426-427, 406 N.Y.S.2d 16, 21-22 {1978) (where
there is evidence that a gas company could have been responsible for break in water line, negligence of the city cannot
be inferred from the mere happening of the break); Winkler v.
Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 240 Pa. Super. 641, 359 A.2d 440,
443-44 {1976), aff'd, 477 Pa. 445, 384 A.2d 241 {1978)
{because there are •numerous explanations• and the presence
of a latent, undiscoverable defect that could have caused a
sticking door, plaintiff could not recover on the basis of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
In the case at bar, defendant's employee, Mr. Hunt, testified that it was entirely possible for the pallets to be
removed, replaced, run over or otherwise tampered with by
third parties.

(R. 341, 365-66).

In fact, plaintiff affir-

matively employs that testimony in his brief.

Further, there

is evidence that there was a latent defect in the pallet upon
which plaintiff was injured, which was not discoverable by a
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reasonable inspection.

While plaintiff claims that defendant

should have discovered the latent defect, plaintiff has never
explained what type of inspection or testing should have been
employed by defendant.

Surely plaintiff would not require

defendant to do any more inspection than he did himself;
namely, both a visual inspection and a physical inspection by
actually stepping on the pallet and testing its strength.
Plaintiff was just as capable, if not more so, of discovering
the defect because of his vast experience with pallets.
Finally, Mr. Hunt testified that the pallets were
received from various suppliers.

(R. 336-37).

The pallet

upon which plaintiff was injured was one constructed by one
of those third persons, rather than by defendant, and there
was no evidence that any pallet was constructed or supplied
solely by defendant.

The manufacturer's faulty construction

could have caused a latent defect in the pallet.

Because of

these many possible explanations, the pallet could not have
been within the control or responsibility of defendant and
plaintiff should not be entitled to invoke the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GAVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON UNAVOIDABLE
ACCIDENT AND EVEN IF IT WAS ERRONEOUS, IT
WAS HARMLESS ERROR

The trial court's instruction on unavoidable accident was
proper under the circumstances of the case.

Notwithstanding

any claimed error in giving the instruction, such error, if
any, was harmless.
Plaintiff has already drawn the attention of the court to
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968}.
There, plaintiff brought an action on behalf of her son to
recover for the son's injury when defendant, while backing
out of a driveway, ran into the boy.

Defendant contended

that the accident was unavoidable because she could not see
the child when she began backing.

The evidence apparently

supported such a contention because the trial court gave an
instruction on unavoidable accident.

The trial court entered

judgment on a verdict for defendant and plaintiff appealed,
claiming the instruction on unavoidable accident was improper.

This court affirmed, holding that under the cir-

cumstances of the case, the instruction was proper and stated:
It is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e.,
unusual and unexpected occurrences, which result in
injury and which happen without anyone failing to
exercise reasonable care; and when this is so the
accident is properly classified as unavoidable inso-
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far as legal causation or the imposition of liability is concerned.
Id., 436 P.2d at 445.

Accord, Anderton v. Montgomery, 607

P.2d 828, 834-35 (Utah 1980); Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8,
465 P.2d 169, 170-71 (1970).
Courts from other jurisdictions have permitted the use of
an unavoidable accident instruction in cases where a latent
or undiscoverable defect may have been the cause of the accident.

In Guanzon v. Kalamau, 48 Hawaii 330, 402 P.2d 289

(1965), plaintiff was struck from behind while sitting at a
stop in his vehicle.

Defendant, the driver of the vehicle

behind, claimed that his brakes failed but that just prior to
the accident they worked fine.

The lower court gave an in-

struction on unavoidable accident and entered
defendant pursuant to a jury verdict.

ju~gment

for

The Hawaii Supreme

Court affirmed with regard to the unavoidable accident instruction and held that since there was some evidence to show
that the accident was unavoidable, under the circumstances
the instruction was proper.

The court stated that •[m]echan-

ical failure or malfunction due to a latent defect would
clearly seem to constitute 'exceptional circumstances' and an
instance in which the unavoidable accident instruction 'is
peculiarly appropriate.••

Id., 402 P.2d at 297.

See also,

Ackerman v. Terpsma, 74 Wash. 2d 209, 445 P.2a 19, 23 (1968)
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(where there was some evidence of latent defect, an unavoidable accident instruction was proper).
In this case, plaintiff states that although he observed
a crack in one of the boards and a bend in another, he did
not observe any defects in the specific boards he claims
broke and he allegedly fell through.
322).

(R. 235, 296, 308, 314,

Similarly, defendant was not aware of any defects in

the boards.

(R. 360-61).

Since plaintiff, who had vast

experience with pallets, was unable to observe the defect, it
must have been a latent defect in the pallet that caused
plaintiff's injury.

Thus, the accident may have been

unavoidable since neither plaintiff nor defendant observed
the defect in the pallet, and were not negligent in failing
to do so because the defect was latent and undetectable by
any reasonable inspection or testing.

Consequently, it was

proper for the trial court in this case to give the unavoidable accident instruction.
Even assuming the unavoidable accident instruction was
given in error, such error, if any, was not prejudicial and
was harmless.

This court further stated in Woodhouse:

[E]ven the cases which disapprove of the instruction
as error recognize that whether it is ground for
reversal depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In that connection it is important that
at the time of the trial of this case it had never
been adjudicated in this state that the giving of an
instruction on unavoidable accident was prejudicial
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error. • • • Assuming it to be the repetion of an
idea and that it is best to avoid repetion where
possible, the mere duplication of an idea in the
instruction is not reversable error. If it were,
very few if any sets of instructions could be sustained as errorless.
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, 445
(1968).

Thus, even if, as plaintiff apparently contends, the

instruction was duplicative of the other negligence instructions, it was not reversable error.
This court states in Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d
828, 834-35 (1980), that an unavoidable accident instruction
is not prejudicial or reversible error •unless it results in
the instructions given being weighted, as a whole, in favor
of the defendant.•

The instructions in the present case in-

dicate no such •weighting.•

Further, the instruction was

somewhat helpful to plaintiff since it could be used to
determine that plaintiff was not negligent either.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO PERMIT
PLAIN~IFF TO CROSS-EXAMINE DEFENDANT'S WITNESS FROM WRITTEN INTERROGATORY ANSWERS
Rule 33(b) provides:

•rnterrogatories may relate to any

matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the
answers may be used to the extent permitted by the rules of
evidence.•

Utah R. Civ. P. 33(b).

Thus, plaintiff was

required to show that the Answers to Interrogatories were
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admissible as evidence before they could be admitted and he
could use them for the purpose of cross-examination."

Plain-

tiff claims that the Answers to Interrogatories signed by Mr.
Street, defendant's manager, were admissible as evidence
because they were to be used for the purposes of impeachment
and they were an admission of a party.
The attempted use of the Answers to Interrogatories for
impeachment purposes was inappropriate.

Mr. Hunt admitted

that he did not know whether Mr. Kusy had fallen off the
pallet or whether it had broken.

(R. 369).

Hunt simply said

that after the accident he saw no broken boards, but he did
not see the event itself.

(R. 353, 356, 366).

Thus, im-

peachment by use of the answer to Interrogatory No. 9 (which
states that the pallet broke and Mr. Kuzy fell through) would
be meaningless since Mr. Hunt admitted that Mr. Kuzy could
have fallen through broken boards in the pallet.

(R. 369).

In light of plaintiff's virtually uncontradicted testimony
wherein he stated he fell through a broken board on the
pallet and Mr. Hunt's testimony that it could have happened
that way, the use of the Answers to Interrogatories for purposes of impeachment was irrelevant and would have added
nothing to plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff also argues that the Answers to Interrogatories
were admissible as an admission of a party.

He cites Hill v.
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Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970),
which holds:

•1n any case where answers to interrogatories

are to be used to establish a fact, they can only be used as
admissions against the party making them.•

Id., 477 P.2d at

151.
Rule 63(7) of the Rules of Evidence provides that an
admission is admissible if it is •[a]s against himself a
statement by a person who is a party to the action in his
individual or a representative capacity and, if the latter,
who is acting in such representative capacity in making the
statement.•

Utah. R. Evid. 63(7).

In the case at bar, Mr.

Hunt was not acting in a representative capacity for defendant; he was acting as a witness to the events of the accident.

The party who was acting in his representative capa-

city for defendant by signing the Answers to Interrogatories,
Mr. Street, was not present at the trial and was not subpoened by plaintiff.

There was no evidence that he was

unavailable to be called as a witness at trial.
422).

(R. 365,

Consequently, the lower court ruled correctly that the

Answers to Interrogatories could not be admitted.
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POINT IV
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES INDICATE NO PASSION OR PREJUDICE AGAINST PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff's claim that the award for general damages was
as a result of passion and prejudice against plaintiff by the
jury, is unfounded.
Certainly, the best reason for the jury verdict of norninal general damages was the fact that they had already found
defendant was not negligent in causing plaintiff's injury,
and most certainly knew that defendant would not be required
to pay !.!!Y amount.

It was more likely that, instead of the

no negligence finding being influenced by the low general
damages finding, it was the other way around.

Even if the

jury improperly awarded no general damages, this court should
not find error when the trial judge remedied the situation by
causing the jury to return for further deliberation on
general damages as provided under Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

See Langton v. International Transport,

Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211, 1215 (1971).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the criteria for giving
the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur.

Not only is

there evidence that plaintiff's injury could have happened
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without negligence on anyone's part, there is also evidence
that the pallet that plaintiff fell through or from, was not
within the control or responsibility of defendant.

Indeed,

plaintiff himself had control over whether he was injured by
the pallet because he was at least as able, if not more so,
to observe any defects that might be present in the pallet.
The unavoidable accident instruction was proper under the
circumstances of the case since there was evidence that a
latent defect, undiscoverable by either of the parties, could
have caused the accident.

Regardless, even if the instruc-

tion was given in error, it was harmless since the instruction was at most, duplicative and did not cause the instructions as a whole to be weighted in defendant's favor.
Under the Rules of Evidence, plaintiff has failed to show
any reason why Answers to Interrogatories signed by Mr.
Street could be admitted at trial for the purposes of crossexamining Mr. Hunt.

The Answers to Interrogatories had no

impeachment value since Mr. Hunt was not the person who
signed the Answers to Interrogatories on defendant's behalf,
nor did he deny what was contained in the Answers to Interrogatories.

Further, the Answers to Interrogatories could

not be admitted as an admission against a party since Mr.
Hunt was not acting in his representative capacity for K-Mart
at the trial, but simply as a witness.

The proper represen-
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tative of K-Mart with regard to the Answers to Interrogatories, Mr. Street, was not present at the trial and plaintiff did not show that he was unavailable.
Finally, plaintiff has failed to establish that the lower
court improperly denied a new trial on the basis that the
jury gave an inadequate general damage award.
The trial court committed no reversible error and its
judgment was proper.

The judgment for defendant and order

denying a new trial should be affirmed.
DATED this 1st day of November, 1982.
Respectfully submitted.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Allan
rson
Attorney
or Defendant/
Respondent
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